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ACCEPTANCE PRACTICE
The material published below summarizes a report of the Federal Reserve Committee on acceptance
practice made to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and to the Conference of Presidents
of Federal Reserve Banks.
In view of the experience of American
banks with their acceptance credits in Ger-
many and several other European countries,
the Conference of Governors of Federal Re-
serve Banks, at the suggestion of the Federal
Reserve Board, appointed in the spring of
1932 a committee to review American ac-
ceptance practice.
The committee was made up of operating
officers of the Reserve banks and consisted at
first of Mr. E. R. Kenzel, chairman, Mr. Ira
Clerk, and Mr. C. R. McKay, Deputy Gov-
ernors respectively of the Federal Reserve
Banks of New York, San Francisco, and Chi-
cago. It was determined by the Federal Re-
serve Board that its representation on the
Committee should be through its senior staff,
and Mr. W. W. Riefler of the Division of Re-
search and Statistics of the Federal Reserve
Board was detailed to assist in the formula-
tion of procedure and analyzing the informa-
tion obtained. Mr. Riefler was succeeded in
the assignment by Mr. G. W. Blattner of the
same division.
At the time the material collected by the
Committee was being organized for this re-
port, the untimely death of its chairman, Mr.
Kenzel, occurred and Mr. W. Randolph Bur-
gess, Deputy Governor of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York was appointed to
his place. The report was also submitted to
and comments were received from the other
members of the sub-committee of the Sys-
tem's General Committee on Bankers' Ac-
ceptances: Mr. W. W. Paddock, first vice-
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, and Mr. F. J. Zurlinden, first vice-
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland.
In the collection of data all the Reserve
banks and all of the important accepting
banks in this country, members as well as
nonmembers of the Reserve System, partici-
pated ; and in the analysis of these data and
the preparation of the report the Committee
was aided by the officers and staff of the Re-
serve Board and a number of the Reserve
banks.
The work of the Committee extended over
a period of nearly four years, and a final re-
port was made to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the Confer-
ence of Presidents of Federal Reserve Banks
in late 1936.
The more important parts of the report are
here quoted or summarized for the informa-
tion of accepting institutions and others in-
terested in the subject.
In general, the plan for approaching the
problem of acceptance practice, that is the
soundness of the business conducted by ac-
ceptors, entailed requesting each organiza-
tion which had been an important acceptor in
the past decade for detailed information with
respect to every credit "on which the bank's
customer failed promptly to meet obligation
to place the accepting bank in possession of
funds to pay the acceptance." Seven differ-
ent styles of schedules were contrived, one for
each of the following classes of credits:
I. Import credit
II. Export credit
III. Domestic shipment credit
IV. Credit covering shipments between foreign
countries
V. Domestic storage credit
VI. Foreign storage credit
VII. Dollar exchange credit
These seven classifications, in which ac-
ceptances are naturally grouped on the basis
of the style of underlying transaction, were
suggested by the development of the law and
regulations and are recognized in the main
by the statistics currently compiled by the
American Acceptance Council. The Council,
however, in reporting acceptances outstand-
ing from time to time includes in one group-
ing shipment between or storage in foreign
countries.
In addition to making inquiry into the ex-
perience relating to individual credits, ac-
cepting banks were asked for expressions of
opinion as to desired changes in the law and
regulations or practices.
Assembly of Replies to Questionnaires.—
Although the replies of the accepting banks
were assembled in the main during the early
part of 1933, there were delays associated
with the strenuous duties of all sorts de-
manded of bankers during the months fol-
lowing the banking holiday. Furthermore,
it was desired to include as complete a study
of experience with the so-called standstill
agreements of Germany and other countries
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as was possible. This delay served an addi-
tional useful purpose since it permitted the
completion of the study of a number of im-
portant cases, final settlement of which was
still in suspense at the time the original ques-
tionnaires were submitted.
Replies to Questionnaires.—The various
Federal Reserve banks requested for the
Committee reports on questionnaires from
170 accepting institutions, distributed among
Federal Reserve districts as follows:
District District
1. Boston 17 7. Chicago 11
2. New York 41 8. St. Louis 6
3. Philadelphia .... 9 9. Minneapolis .... 5
4. Cleveland 13 10. Kansas City ... 13
5. Richmond 14 11. Dallas 8
6. Atlanta 15 12. San Francisco . . 18
All districts 170
Responses were received from 156 banks in
all, although 116 banks did not fill out any
questionnaires since they had encountered no
unfavorable experience. One or more un-
satisfactory credits were reported by each of
40 institutions, 31 being member banks.
Actual losses were reported by only 24 banks.
In all, 188 cases of credits upon which some
difficulty was experienced were reported.
These cases of unsatisfactory experience wer<r
distributed among Federal Reserve districts
according to the location of the accepting in-
stitution as follows:
District District
1. Boston 18 7. Chicago 27
2. New York 135 8. St. Louis 0
3. Philadelphia 1 9. Minneapolis .... 0
4. Cleveland 1 10. Kansas City ... 0
5. Richmond 0 11. Dallas 0
6. Atlanta 0 12. San Francisco . . 6
All districts 188
Reporting Institutions.—Among the 156
institutions which responded to the Commit-
tee's questionnaires were practically all of
those which the American Acceptance Coun-
cil reports as accounting for upwards of 90
percent of the current acceptance business.
There were, however, many important ac-
ceptors in earlier years, whose names no
longer appear on the list. In nearly all in-
stances such institutions were merged with
others and the consolidated institution con-
tinues to be a leading acceptor and one which
responded fo> the Committee's questionnaire.
The Committee took steps to discover whether
existing acceptors accounted for the unfavor-
able experience suffered by institutions ab-
sorbed by them. While every instance of an
unsatisfactory credit experienced by a
merged institution was not reported to the
Committee, investigations indicate that most
of the important ones were. The Committee
feels that the returns in hand are as complete
in this respect for all practical purposes as
they need be and that the inclusion of such
experiences as may have been omitted would
merely emphasize the facts revealed by the
responses received.
Bills in Difficulty, 1920-1932.—The ques-
tionnaires returned by acceptors indicated
an aggregate of $38,300,000 of bills accepted
during 1920-1932 "on which the bank's cus-
tomer failed promptly to meet the obligation
to place the accepting bank in possession of
funds to pay the acceptance." Acceptances
associated with standstill agreements were
not included, as accepting institutions had
been told that "it is not desired, however, that
these reports be filled out for credits where
the only difficulty was a slight delay in receipt
of remittance or for credits the maturities of
which have been prolonged solely because of
standstill or other similar country-wide re-
strictions."
No acceptance was reported as having been
in difficulty prior to 1920.
Indicated Losses, 1920-1932.—In connec-
tion with the aggregate of the $38,300,000
of bills with respect to which the bank cus-
tomer failed promptly to meet the full obli-
gation, collections through August 1935 had
amounted to $23,300,000; an aggregate of
$4,700,000 was still in suspense; and losses
had been written off to the extent of $10,-
300,000. These figures, of course, do not in-
clude losses incurred by American acceptors
in connection with bills included in standstill
arrangements with central European coun-
tries. This experience will be referred to
separately in the latter part of this report.
The volume of losses of $10,300,000 does
not appear large when compared with the
aggregate acceptance business done during
the years 1920-1932, which has been esti-
mated at $50,000,000,000. The indicated
losses, therefore, have been slightly over
.02 of 1 percent of the total acceptance busi-
ness done during the years 1920-1932; losses
plus amounts still in suspense, less than .04 of
1 percent. Commission received by the ac-
cepting banks for their undertakings, aggre-
gated at least $125,000,000 on the basis of a
charge of *4 of 1 percent for 90 day credits.
Since the primary purpose of this survey
was to ascertain from actual experience what
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change if any should be made in existing law,
regulations, or practice in order to correct
any evident weakness which may exist in the
business of extending acceptance credits, an
accurate analysis should be based on the
types of transactions which led to difficulty
or loss rather than on the dollar amounts in-
volved. Obviously in following the latter
course a single transaction involving a very
substantial sum might appear to outweigh
several other types of transactions aggregat-
ing a smaller dollar value. Accordingly the
former method would appear to be the better
basis for analysis. Unfortunately, however,
the replies from reporting banks show only
those transactions which resulted in difficulty
or loss and there is no way of ascertaining
the actual number of transactions of corre-
sponding type which were consummated sat-
isfactorily. As a consequence this survey
can indicate only the relationship of the in-
dividual types of unsatisfactory credit to the
total number of cases involving difficulty or
loss.
Large Individual Losses.—Although there
were 186 cases of credits in some kind of diffi-
culty from 1920-1932, 92 cases contributed
the total losses of $10,300,000. The number
of cases involved is shown by classes of
credits in Table 1.
TABLE 1.—NUMBER OF CASES OF ACCEPTANCE CREDITS















The extent to which the aggregate losses
were contributed by a few large cases is strik-
ing. For example, losses of $1,221,000 asso-
ciated with acceptances executed under im-
port credits during the years 1925-1932 grew
out of 25 cases in all, but 4 cases contributed
$827,000 of losses.
In connection with acceptances executed
during 1925-1932 involving shipments be-
tween foreign countries, $3,101,000 of losses
were recorded, associated with 24 cases, but
4 cases contributed losses of $1,953,000.
These 8 large cases may be briefly described















Covers period from 1925-
Collected $4,688,000 1933. Irregular use of
Suspense $62,000 credit by taker in the
(Latter being re- early days resulted in a
duced by regular loss to the bank, which
payments and be- continued to carry the
lieved to be safe.) account in an effort to
reduce the deficit, but
price decline in 1932 forced
a write-off of $250,000.
830,035.66 Sept.-Nov. $155,000 written off Drop in market value of
merchandise, and of se-
curities pledged as col-
lateral.
1930 as a loss.
Collected $673,000
Suspense $2,000
593,564.54 1928 Loss of $241, 670. 58. Takers of credit got into
Balance paid. difficulties, making it
necessary for bank to take
over the manufacture and
sales of merchandise.
Liens placed by others on
some of the merchandise
forced liquidation, there-
by enhancing bank's loss.
SHIPMENTS BETWEEN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
503, 500.00 May 1926 $302, 925. 36 loss. Customer failed.
Balance paid.
913,655.17 Aug. 1931 Loss $439,000. Customer failed.
Balance still in sus-
pense; receiving re-
coveries.
1, 659, 308. 82 April 1932 Loss $900,000. Evidence of mis-represen-
Balance still in sus- tation.
pense.
468, 211. 86 1931 Collected $52,784.09 Evidence of mis-represen-
Loss 312,195. 93 tation.
Suspense 103,231.84
Table 2 shows the distribution of difficulty
and losses among seven classes of acceptance
credits.
TABLE 2.—AGGREGATES OF BILLS ACCEPTED IN 1920-1932
IN DIFFICULTY, BY CLASS OF CREDIT—SUBSEQUENT

































































On the basis of the figures shown in Table
2, it would appear that experience has been
least satisfactory among import credits. The
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aggregate of bills in difficulty in this class
was larger than in the case of any other and
losses written off were larger. By these tests
transactions involving shipments between
foreign countries afforded the next most un-
satisfactory experience. In this form the
figures are inconclusive, however, since the
amount of difficulty encountered in each class
of credit needs to be related to the aggregate
business done in the category during those
years. An effort to do this is the subject of
some subsequent paragraphs.
It is possible that actual losses suffered by
acceptors may be higher than would appear
from those reported, as a substantial part of
the $4,700,000 now being held in suspense has
been outstanding for at least three years.
Conservative accounting might well have
written off some of this aggregate as a loss
before now, although reports indicate that a
substantial portion of this suspense will prob-
ably be recovered eventually.
Losses by Years.—Acceptance difficulties
leading to losses were greatest in years of
business recession and price decline, such as
1920, 1921, 1924, 1931, and 1932. It will be
recalled that this survey did not include any
business originating after 1932. Table 3
shows the losses by the years when the rela-
tive bills were accepted.
TABLE 3.—LOSSES WRITTEN OFF ON BILLS ACCEPTED IN















































































































Experience, 1925-1932.—In several re-
spects there is a natural division of accept-
ance experience as between the years ending
with 1924 and those beginning with the year
1925. A large increase in the acceptance
business as a whole began after 1924, and ac-
ceptance practice at some points was im-
proved as a result of lessons learned from
unsatisfactory experiences of earlier years.
Business in some of the major classes of ac-
ceptances, moreover, amounted to little prior
to 1925.
The chart on page 850 shows the volume
of acceptances outstanding by classes at the
end of each month for all available months.
Separate figures were not published by the
American Acceptance Council for the two
classifications "shipment between foreign
countries" and "storage in foreign coun-
tries."
The chart brings out the fact that import
credit transactions had existed in large vol-
ume prior to 1925. On the other hand, trans-
actions involving shipments between or stor-
age in foreign countries were negligible in
size in 1925 and 1926, began to increase
rapidly in 1927, and by the latter part of 1929
exceeded import credit transactions. Accept-
ances outstanding in the class of foreign
storage and shipment at the end of the year
1930 amounted to more than $550,000,000,
while import acceptances outstanding were
but slightly more than $200,000,000. The
rapid increase following 1927 in acceptances
outstanding to finance shipments between or
storage in foreign countries reflects in part
revision by the Federal Reserve Board of its
rulings to permit the acceptance of bills in
TABLE 4.—AGGREGATE OF BILLS ACCEPTED IN 1925-1932
IN DIFFICULTY BY CLASS OF CREDITS—SUBSEQUENT























































export transactions after the goods had actu-
ally arrived at their destination. This broad-
ening of ruling followed some recession in
trade in 1924 and in 1927, and was particu-
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larly designed to assist in furthering our ex-
ports of cotton and other raw products.
Table 4 shows by class of credits the experi-
ence with respect to difficulties on bills ac-
cepted in the years 1925-1932.
The table brings out the fact that when
acceptance experience after 1924 is viewed
separately the unsatisfactory experience in
the import credit classification based solely
on dollar amounts involved no longer over-
shadows that in some other classes. Total
acceptances in difficulty in the import credit
class amounted to $8,889,000 on which losses
of $1,221,000 were written off while $557,000
of bills were still in suspense. Among credits
involving shipments between foreign coun-
tries, total acceptances in difficulty amounted
to $8,872,000 on which losses of $3,101,000
were written off while $2,918,000 of bills
were in suspense.
Difficulties Compared with Volume Out-
standing.—The bare aggregates of difficulties
give no indication of their relative signifi-
cance in the various classes, but should be
related to the volume of acceptances which
have been negotiated in the various classes
during the period.
The volume of acceptances in the various
classes executed in each year during 1925-
1932 has been estimated by multiplying the*
average outstandings by 4 since the accept-
ance business turns over roughly every 90
days. The following tabulation shows the
estimated volume of acceptances negotiated.
TABLE 5.—ESTIMATED VOLUME OF ACCEPTANCES NE-
GOTIATED DURING 1925-1932 BY CLASS OF CREDITS
Class of !






































































When the aggregate losses suffered by
classes of bills drawn during the period 1925-
1932 are compared with the volume of ac-
ceptances negotiated, it would appear that
relative losses were more significant among
credits involving shipment between and stor-
age in foreign countries than in the other
classes. Losses plus items still in suspense
were four times as much as those among im-
port credits as shown in Table 6. As previ-
ously noted these figures do not include
credits covered by standstill agreements
which will be referred to later. Too much
weight should not be given to this comparison
based on dollar amounts, as the credits based
on shipments between and storage in foreign
countries on which losses were taken happen
to include a number of large transactions.
(See Table 1.)
Table 6 shows the difficulties per $100 of
bills negotiated during 1925-1932.
TABLE 6.—AGGREGATE OF BILLS ACCEPTED IN 1925-1932
IN DIFFICULTY PER $100 OF ESTIMATED TOTAL OF













































It would appear from the analysis made by
the Committee that in some of the acceptance
business acceptors have not shown a high de-
gree of vigilance in assuring themselves that
their business was carrying a minimum
amount of risk. For example, there were
losses of $3,326,000 suffered in credits involv-
ing shipments between foreign countries.
With respect to practically all of the bills the
acceptor was unable to furnish information
as to what disposition was made of the goods
against which the credit was drawn. With
respect to a quarter of the aggregate, the ac-
ceptors had never seen documentary evidence
that any goods had been shipped but had
relied upon the statements of correspondents
or others.
Long Maturities, Renewals, Revolving
Credits.—In all, there were 92 credits on
which losses were incurred. In 16 cases, these
involved bills with maturities in excess of 90
days, while there were 20 cases of renewal
bills and 22 cases of revolving credits. Thera
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were cases where two or three of these condi-
tions were characteristic of one particular
credit, but in all there were 49 separate
credits which were characterized by one or
more of these conditions.
Out of $10,341,000 of losses, $6,260,000
were on credits which involved one or more
of these characteristics, although it is impos-
sible to determine how much of this loss was
due to these factors and how
T much coinci-
dental.
Goods Released on Trust Receipts.—Half
of the $4,056,000 of losses incurred on import
credits were in connection with transactions
in which the goods were released on trust
receipt. Losses in the other classes of credits
were not associated with trust receipt trans-
actions.
Losses by Underlying Commodities.—Sugar
credits were responsible for $2,500,000 of the
TABLE 7.—LOSSES ON BILLS ACCEPTED IN 1920-1932 BY

























































































































































aggregate losses of $10,300,000. Credits on
peanuts and peanut oil contributed losses of
$644,000 and coffee credits, $568,000. The
losses on sugar occurred largely in connec-
tion with import credits, though a sizeable
loss occurred in foreign storage transactions.
There were important losses in transactions
involving shipment between or storage in
foreign countries in credits on sugar, coffee,
lumber, and tobacco, in importance in the
order mentioned.
Losses by underlying commodities and
class of transaction are shown in some detail
in Table 7.
Losses and Banking Judgment.—Of the ag-
gregate losses revealed by the analysis made
by the Committee a large proportion was in-
curred by a few institutions, five accounting
for 64 percent and ten for 83 percent of all
losses. It is true that these institutions were
among the largest acceptors, but many other
large acceptors reported much smaller losses.
It is a fact worthy of note that the reason
assigned as to why the acceptor was forced to
absorb a loss was in so many cases a reflection
of faulty banking judgment, or of a possible
lack of proper vigilance. Table 8 brings out
the fact that a large proportion of the re-
corded losses was associated with failure of
the borrower, or price declines, or condition
TABLE 8.—REASONS ASSIGNED FOR AMOUNTS OF LOSSES
















































































in the trade, or fraud. These are matters
that it would be difficult to guard against by
provisions in the Board's regulations dealing
with acceptances.
American Acceptance Credits Under Stand-
still Agreements.—So far, :his report has
been confined to a survey of the experience of
American banks in connection with accept-
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ance credits executed between the years 1920
and 1932 inclusive and supplies a reasonably
complete analysis of such unsatisfactory
cases as have occurred in the acceptance busi-
ness as it has grown up under existing stat-
utes and regulations. It has omitted any
study of the so-called standstill agreements:
arrangements which applied to short term
credits, and which were established between
foreign creditor banks and their customers
in certain countries whose governments, be-
cause of economic conditions, adopted restric-
tive regulations controlling the conduct and
settlement of foreign trade accounts.
The purpose of such agreements, generally
speaking, has been two-fold: to prevent
wholesale withdrawal of foreign capital
which w
rould be ruinous to the exchange value
of the currency and to overseas trade, and to
enable creditors over a period to liquidate
their commitments in as orderly a manner
and at as little sacrifice as possible.
The problem created by these agreements
is in many respects quite outside the field of
ordinary acceptance experience. Therefore,
it was not possible to apply the same type of
analysis to standstill credits as was used in
the case of non-standstill credits. It seems
appropriate to include in this report, how-
ever, a summary as to two points, the losses
sustained by accepting banks, and the char-
acter of the paper drawn under credits made
subject to standstill agreements.
Losses Incurred in Standstill Liquidation.
—It should be borne in mind that the agree-
ments arose not from the inability of the
debtors to meet their obligations in their own
currencies but from their inability to make
transfers of funds through the normal chan-
nel of the international exchanges. This is
confirmed by most of our accepting banks, as
illustrated by the comment of one of the in-
stitutions whose experience is included in this
survey. The bank in question, after referring
to the prolongation of credits by the various
standstill arrangements with central Euro-
pean countries and exchange controls which
have stopped payment for goods in gold, goes
on to state that they have many customers
who, although possessed of ample resources,
are prevented by government decrees from
converting these resources to make possible
payment of contracted obligations. Further-
more, the great majority of credits extended
by American banks under the most important
standstill agreement, that with Germany,
have been extended to German banks, and
public policy has not permitted any of the
latter to suspend payments. Hence losses
which creditors have incurred in connection
with acceptance credits subject to standstill
agreements have not arisen from fault in the
individual credit but have been due almost
wholly to the discount incident to the conver-
sion of foreign currencies into dollar ex-
change under existing governmental controls.
Since this discount has ranged from about
15% to 51%, the loss to accepting banks has
been substantial. In the case of Germany,
for example, American banks in liquidating
some $246,000,000 of acceptance credits up to
December 1935 may have lost something be-
tween $32,000,000 and $45,000,000 in dispos-
ing of registered mark balances. Further-
more there have been losses in liquidating
Austrian and Hungarian commitments al-
though absence of available data does not
permit of an estimate of the amount of these
losses. Complete figures of loss in connec-
tion with standstill credits would loom large
beside the $10,000,000 loss shown in other
parts of this report on all other American
acceptance business of some $50,000,000,000.
Under the circumstances outlined above, how-
ever, losses under the standstill are of a quite
different type from those incident to the ordi-
nary practice of the acceptance business.
Character of Acceptances Subject to Stand-
still Agreements.—The second important con-
sideration in reviewing standstill experience
is the character of the paper drawn under
existing credits. There can be no doubt that
a substantial volume of such drawings par-
took at one time or another of the nature of
finance paper and was not supported by ac-
tual commercial or industrial transactions
which would provide self-liquidation for the
bills which our banks were called upon to
accept.
The Committee has examined the available
figures and has asked the opinion of compe-
tent bankers with respect to the extent of
any laxness in practice and the circumstances
under which it occurred. The only figures
which are available on the subject relate to
the period after the standstill agreements had
gone into effect. Reports of 100 American
banks, as of October 31, 1931, indicate that
of $288,000,000 of acceptances outstanding on
that date under the German Standstill Agree-
ment, 39% were accompanied by proof of
eligibility such as shipping documents or
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other evidence; 31%, although unaccom-
panied by documentary evidence, were never-
theless presumably capable of classification
as eligible; and 30 % were definitely not self -
liquidating and offered no evidence as to the
nature of the underlying transaction. In-
formal inquiries among twenty-five of the
most important accepting banks indicate that
at the end of 1935 about three-quarters of
the bills outstanding at that time could be
classified as eligible under the regulations of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System.
German authorities, as well as many ac-
cepting banks, maintain that until recession
in foreign trade set in and commodity prices
began to fall, the great majority of bills pre-
sented for acceptance represented actual self-
liquidating business transactions. There is.
however, considerable testimony that even
before the standstill agreement had gone into
effect some American acceptors had been at
times lax in depending on general statements
made to them by foreign banks and not re-
quiring more; detailed information regarding
the transactions underlying the bills ac-
cepted. Such practice has been at times de-
fended on the ground that it is similar to the
practice of London bankers who have gen-
erally placed more reliance upon names than
op ascertaining that the underlying transac-
tion back of each bill was by nature self-
liquidating. There is no way of knowing the
extent of the laxity which existed in this
particular, although belief in the market is
that it was not general. It does not appear
that laxness of this sort had any important
responsibility for the later losses on accept-
ances except to the extent possibly that a
more exact scrutinv of bills might have led
to a somewhat smaller volume of credit ex-
tension and so to a smaller volume of bills
coming under the standstill agreement. The
probability is, however, that more precise
technical requirements would not greatly
have restricted the volume of bills drawn.
The total volume of bills was in keeping with
the general tendency of the time toward ex-
cessive credits of all sorts to the central
European countries.
It is clear that an important change in the
character of bills took place at the time the
standstill agreements went into effect. With
the decrease in volume of transactions which
could give rise to eligible bills, many foreign
customers of accepting banks found it in-
creasingly difficult to provide eligible paper,
although they were still in need of working
capital. Under the standstill agreement, the
Germans agreed to provide eligible paper as
far as possible and the right is reserved,
when it is not possible, to carry the resulting
debt in the form of a cash advance or over-
draft, of course at a higher rate of interest.
The majority of accepting banks have so
treated bills which were not definitely self-
liquidating. Indeed, to a large extent they
have kept their German bills off the market
entirely.
Although the large amount of finance paper
which admittedly existed can scarcely be
reconciled with the ideals of the best banking
practice, losses incurred by American ac-
ceptors due to this cause have been negligible,
since, as stated above, the majority of Amer-
ican credits were extended to German banks
which as a matter of public policy have not
been allowed to fail.
By far the greater part of American ac-
ceptance credits subject to standstill agree-
ments have been extended to German banks
which in turn made them available to their
commercial and industrial customers. Con-
sequently, there have been numerous sub-
stitutions of one debtor for another as well
as changes in the types of transactions under-
lying the bills presented for acceptance. In
addition, not infrequently original accept-
ances have become overdrafts and subse-
quently been replaced by bills which again
have become overdrafts so that except in
relatively few cases there has been no real
continuity of individual credits. For these
reasons it does not appear possible to apply
the same methods of analysis to individual
acceptances as were used in the earlier part
of this report.
Acceptors' Recommendations for Changes
in Rules of Procedure.—Of the 156 banks
which responded to the questionnaires only
about 20 made definite recommendations as
to changes in the law or regulations relative
to acceptances. The recommendations may
be classified: (a) for more restrictive re-
quirements; (b) for liberalizations.
More Restrictive Requirements.—In con-
nection with more restrictive requirements,
the largest number of suggestions were made
with respect to shipments between foreign
countries and the smallest number with re-
spect to import credits. A brief summary
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of the more important of these suggestions is
given by class of credit as follows:
Import Credits:
When goods released on trust receipt, latter
should not remain outstanding after transaction
completed.
Export Credits:
Restrict financing with respect to secondary dis-
tribution to such merchandise as remains in orig-
inal form.
Documentary evidence desirable when acceptance
drawn by another bank and secured by export
bills.
Actual documents should be in hands of ac-
ceptor from date of acceptance.
Domestic Shipment Credits:
When goods released on trust receipt, latter
should not remain outstanding after transaction
completed.
On six months' drafts, tenor should be re-
stricted to that of eligibility for rediscount.
Credits Covering Shipments between Foreign
Countries:
Acceptor should see satisfactory evidence of
shipment.
Foreign correspondent should furnish full in-
formation with respect to purpose, customer, and
self-liquidation.
Basis of transaction should be more clearly de-
fined.
Same requirements as for domestic shipment
should apply.
Require letter of guarantee from actual taker
of credit.
Domestic Storage Credits:
Emphasize independence of warehouse from
credit taker.
On six months' bills, tenor should be restricted
to those eligible for rediscount.
Require accepting bank to secure sworn state-
ment from warehouse. Restrict business to li-
censed warehouses only.
Require licensed grader's certificate.
"Specifically, we wish to call attention to the
fact that Article B of Regulation A recites that
the Federal Reserve Bank may discount bills cov-
ering the storage of readily marketable staples,
provided the bill is secured at the time of ac-
ceptance and that under certain conditions a
Trust Receipt may be taken. Article A of Regu-
lation C recites that member banks may accept
such bills, but it is not indicated that a Trust
Receipt may be taken. It would, therefore, ap-
pear that a member bank could accept a bill hav-
ing warehouse receipts in its possession at the
time of acceptance and might release the security
free, provided it remained within the 10% of cap-
ital and surplus limit. Such a bill, however, would
appear to be ineligible for discount under Regula-
tion A."
Foreign Storage Credits:
Acceptor should see satisfactory evidence of
storage.
Require letter of guarantee from actual taker
of credit.
Dollar Exchange Credits:
Restrict to amounts which may be covered in
due course by export documentary bills.
General:
Limit acceptance business to transactions where
evidence of shipment presented.
Maturity of acceptance should coincide with
usual credit period. Add to Article B, Section
XI: "Where the details of the underlying com-
mercial transaction are not otherwise evidenced,
the acceptor shall obtain a statement of its essen-
tial details."
Actual bills of lading should pass through bank.
It will be noted from the foregoing that the
greatest unanimity as to suggestions relative
to any one phase of acceptance practice is
evident in the category of credits covering
shipments between and storage of goods in
foreign countries.
Many of the suggestions appear to be so
obviously matters of ordinary credit judg-
ment and plain common sense that it would
seem scarcely necessary to embody them in
formal rules and regulations.
Suggestions for Liberalizations.—Proposals
for liberalizing the law and regulations were
made with respect to two classes of credits:
domestic shipment and domestic storage. Re-
moval of the 50 per cent limitation with re-
spect to domestic acceptances was suggested
by several acceptors. Broadening the list of
commodities eligible for domestic storage
credits was also mentioned. With respect to
credits growing out of domestic shipment,
it was recommended that the requirement as
to documents conveying security title be
liberalized.
A significant point of view was expressed
by several acceptors, one of which stated:
"We realize that at the inception of the accept-
ance business in this country a certain degree of
regulation was required in order that this new form
of credit should not be directed into improper chan-
nels, but it is now pertinent to inquire whether the
increased understanding of the nature and objec-
tive of this facility does not merit a complete re-
vision of these requirements.
"This is particularly true of transactions for do-
mestic account. We feel that too often the mere
fact that a transaction measures up to the stand-
ards established by the Federal Reserve Bank in
defining eligibility has swayed the judgment of the
accepting bank as to its soundness as a banking
proposition. Obviously, eligibility is no criterion
for judging credits, but it is apparently an undeni-
able influence due possibly to the emphasis that the
Federal Reserve Bank rulings place on the matter
of eligibility. We feel the time must come when
the Federal Reserve Bank should place its chief
reliance on the judgment and standing of the ac-
cepting bank, and use that more as a standard for
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purchasing or discounting bankers acceptances',
rather than the fact that the bill offered complies
to the letter of certain regulations. Other accepting
markets have effectively controlled their acceptance
business in this manner without the restrictions of
well meant, but inelastic regulations."
CONCLUSIONS
The statistical analysis pursued by the
Committee confirms the impression hereto-
fore prevailing in most quarters that the
preponderant part of the acceptance business
of American banks as it has grown up under
the guidance of the regulations of the Board
has been satisfactory. There is no recorded
instance of an investor in bankers accept-
ances having lost a dollar of principal and
no bank has closed or suspended payments
because of difficulties arising from its ac-
ceptance business. The analysis has shown
that losses which have been suffered by
American institutions because of their ac-
ceptance commitments have been for the most
part associated with the types of eventualities
which should be forestalled more by the
judgment, prudence, and vigilance of bank-
ers than by official regulations. Of the
$10,300,000 of losses suffered by acceptor
in the years 1920-1932, not including the
losses growing out of standstill business,
about 80 per cent were associated with such
matters as: failure of the customer, price
declines, conditions of the trade, and fraud
It seems to the Committee, however, thai
this record does not justify an attitude of
complacence on the part of the Federal Re-
serve System in its general responsibility f 01
the rules and regulations under which Amer-
ican acceptance business is done. The Com-
mittee holds the view that the bankers' ac-
ceptance should be the prime commercial
credit instrument, and that acceptances which
come into the market should be based on
transactions as nearly riskless and above sus-
picion as possible. On such a premise, any
loss in the field should be the occasion of
regret and of effort to foreclose its recurrence.
The statistics indicate that, even omitting
standstill credits which are a separate prob-
lem, the greatest amounts of unsatisfactory
experience were encountered in the fields of
shipment between and storage in foreign
countries, and import transactions.
There is, however, considerable ground for
believing that American banks did not uni-
formly adhere to the ideals of acceptance
practice in their central European business.
In the light both of this study and the ex-
perience with standstill bills, many acceptors
have expressed the belief that the regulations
should be tightened to raise the standard of
acceptance practices in the field of shipment
between and storage in foreign countries.
With respect to such transactions several rec-
ommendations made by acceptors looked in
the direction of requiring that the accepting
bank be in possession of full information as
to the financial responsibility of the recipient
of the credit and the self-liquidating nature
of the transaction, and that a more adequate
control over the goods by the agent of the
accepting institution should prevail until the
credit be liquidated. This point of view was
particularly well expressed by one important
accepting bank:
"When the use of the acceptance facility was
initially fostered and laws and regulations formu-
lated, every effort was made to prevent the accept-
ance of purely finance bills, and provisions were
made for exhibition of documents evidencing re-
lated actual self-liquidating transactions as the
basis for acceptance financing. Later the regula-
tions were modified and the broadest latitude per-
mitted member banks in determining eligibility.
This greater freedom resulted in certain abuses, im-
proper practices and the creation of bills not even
remotely associated with transactions which would
liquidate within the life of the bill. Instances of
this nature have been submitted to the standstill
committees with which you are familar. While the
broad powers granted acceptors are highly ad-
vantageous and desirable, we suggest the possibility
that the creation of such bills should be determined
by more definite regulations as to the type and ex-
tent of evidence which should be required by pros-
pective acceptors as to actual contracts of sales to
be financed or actual movements of goods before
bills are accepted as eligible."
The evidence the Committee has assembled
indicates there is room for some improve-
ment of practice along the lines of the fore-
going quotation, especially with respect to
bills covering shipment between and storage
in foreign countries. The Committee has
raised three questions with respect to this
problem:
1. Whether the general field of accept-
ance activities should be narrowed,
2. Whether some additional and more
specific regulations should be issued
on this point,
3. Whether reliance should be placed
mainly upon the gradual develop-
ment of sound traditions of practice
on the part of accepting banks.
These three questions will be discussed in
order.
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1. In the early stages of this project, the
question was raised in the Committee as to
whether "American banks are justified in
granting acceptances to accommodate world
trade other than incidental to facilitating the
needs of American customers directly en-
gaged in exporting or importing goods be-
tween the United States and a foreign coun-
try." This challenge involves, of course, the
question of the "necessity for permitting
banks to grant acceptance credits to finance
(a) movement of goods between two foreign
countries each foreign to the United States;
(b) storage of readily marketable staples in
foreign countries whether or not underlying
commodities were produced in the United
States."
The fact that acceptance activities have
been authorized and practiced extensively in
a field in the past creates a strong presump-
tion against prohibiting them in the future.
If American accepting institutions can find
a profitable and reasonably safe field of ac-
tivity in financing foreign shipment and stor-
age transactions, no sufficient reason for
foreclosing the opportunity seems apparent
to the Committee. From the point of view
of the balance of payments of the United
States the outstanding commitments of Amer-
ican investors in acceptances drawn to finance
transactions involving shipment between and
storage in foreign countries have the same
effect as an equal volume of any other type
of short-term lending. Out of the contacts
and good-will incident to acceptance activi-
ties in this field grow other satisfactory busi-
ness for American banks and their cus-
tomers.
More than this, if reference is made to
British acceptance practice, it is found that
the extension of American activity into the
field of purely foreign transactions has good
precedent. The best information indicates
that a large proportion of the acceptance
liabilities of important British banks relates
to transactions in which neither the buyer
nor the seller of the merchandise is a resident
of the British Isles, or of a British dominion
for that matter. It is to be presumed that
in the future the money market in this coun-
try will be called upon to fulfill many of the
functions of a world money market and the
regulations governing acceptance practice
should, as far as it may safely be done, pro-
vide sufficient latitude for the proper fulfill-
ment of that function.
2. As previously noted several of those
replying to the Committee's questionnaire
have suggested the modification of Federal
Reserve Board regulations to include definite
specification of the type and extent of evi-
dence which should be required by prospective
acceptors as to the actual contract of sales to
be financed or actual movements of goods
before bills are accepted as eligible. The
present regulations as they relate to the
financing of transactions arising out of the
importation or exportation of goods are
drawn in broad terms and make no specific
requirements as to the character of evidence
accepting banks must obtain. The conditions
under which transactions of this sort take
place are so varied that it would be difficult
if not impossible to draw a regulation which
would lay down minutely requirements as to
evidence without making compliance impos-
sible in many sorts of transactions. For
example, in many cases of shipments of goods
between foreign countries it would be impos-
sible for the accepting bank to obtain ship-
ping documents at the time of the acceptance.
It does, however, seem possible that the regu-
lations should contain a general requirement
that with respect to credits covering export
and import transactions and shipments be-
tween foreign countries, the accepting bank
is expected to obtain satisfactory evidence,
documentary or otherwise, as to the precise
nature of the transactions underlying the
credit extended. Such a general requirement
in the regulation serves notice on accepting
banks as to what may be regarded as sound
acceptance practice, and provides a basis for
the examination of individual credits which
may be made later by bank examiners or the
Federal Reserve banks.
3. While as noted above the Committee re-
ceived a number of suggestions for changes
in regulations, the Committee was constantly
impressed with the number of comments to
the effect that sound acceptance practice de-
pended upon credit judgment and the develop-
ment of sound traditions. This point of view
was well expressed by the officer of one of
the large accepting banks in the following
language:
"I cannot help but take this opportunity of re-
iterating * * * that primarily acceptances are an
instrument of credit and their value is based on the
soundness of our judgment of the credit risk in-
volved. It is my impression that the eligibility pro-
visions have a tendency' opposite to their original
intention. To the inexperienced I believe they en-
dow transactions which can be classified under the
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regulations as eligible with a primary assumption
of soundness. A credit risk, of course, does not de-
pend upon the nature of any single transaction but
many other factors enter into the credit risk in-
dependent of the transaction itself."
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. It is recommended that the acceptance
privilege be not withdrawn from any of the
seven important fields.
2. It is recommended that further liberal-
izations in regulations of the Board of Gov-
ernors be not made at this time.
3. It is recommended that a footnote be
added to subparagraph (1) of Section XI of
Regulation A reading as follows:
While it is not a requirement of the eligibility of
bills referred to in clause (1) of Section XI of this
regulation that documents covering the shipment of
goods be attached to the bills at the time of ac-
ceptance, it will be presumed by Federal Reserve
banks in discounting such bills that the accepting
banks have obtained satisfactory evidence as to the
transactions underlying such bills.
4. It is recommended that continued em-
phasis be placed on the procedure of check-up
through examinations. In keeping with this
proposal the Reserve Board on January 29,
1935, addressed letters to the Federal Reserve
Agents and the Comptroller of the Currency
requesting that when examinations of mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System were
being made attention be paid to whether the
acceptance business of the respective bank
was being conducted in conformance with the
law and regulations of the Board.
5. It is also recommended that the Federal
Reserve banks, in addition to their usual
scrutiny of bills from the standpoint of eligi-
bility and acceptability, make at frequent in-
tervals a more extended investigation of bills
which are purchased or offered for purchase
in order to ascertain whether the acceptances
are conforming with sound acceptance prac-
tice.
It must be recognized that in the long
run sound acceptance practice depends most
largely on sound credit judgment on the part
of the accepting bank, and the principal re-
liance for improvement in practice must be
placed upon the gradual process of the season-
ing of judgment of acceptors and the develop-
ment of sound traditions.
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